Category: Blog

Most education companies comparing fractional CMOs are really comparing two different products wearing the same title. One has sold into K-12 before. One hasn’t. The title on the contract looks identical. The first ninety days do not.

I’ve watched founders hire a generalist fractional CMO who ran three excellent SaaS go-to-market motions, sat down with a district-facing pipeline, and diagnosed it the way they’d diagnose any stalled B2B funnel: more content, more sequences, more touches. Three months later the pipeline had more activity and the same number of closed deals. Not because the CMO was bad at the job. Because the job they were trained for and the job in front of them were not the same job.

What Does a K-12 Specialist Fractional CMO Actually Do Differently?

A specialist starts by mapping the buying committee, not the funnel. They know a district decision usually needs a curriculum director, a technology lead, a business office sign-off, and sometimes a school board vote, and that those four people are on different clocks. A generalist starts with the funnel, because the funnel is where their experience lives, and builds a beautiful nurture sequence aimed at a single buyer persona that doesn’t exist in K-12.

Direct answer: the practical difference is sequencing. A specialist builds the account and stakeholder map before touching messaging or channel. A generalist builds messaging and channel first, then discovers the stakeholder map three months in when the deal stalls in procurement.

Why Does This Gap Show Up Even When the Generalist Is Skilled?

Because K-12 breaks the assumptions a generalist B2B playbook is built on. Districts finalize budgets in spring, which means a vendor relationship has to start six to twelve months before a contract is signed, not a quarter. A “hot lead” in most B2B pipelines is someone ready to buy now. In K-12, the person most eager to talk in October is often the one with the least budget authority, and the real buyer won’t engage until the spring planning window opens.

I call this the Portable Playbook Problem: applying a go-to-market motion that worked somewhere else, unmodified, to a market whose calendar, committee, and procurement rules are structurally different. The playbook isn’t wrong. It’s just built for a different clock.

A few patterns show up over and over when a generalist is running K-12 marketing without direct district experience:

A campaign calendar that peaks in Q4, when districts are heads-down in budget planning and not taking vendor meetings. Messaging written for a single economic buyer, when the real sale requires four separate messages for four separate roles. Lead scoring models built for individual urgency, when the actual signal is which point in the district’s fiscal calendar a prospect is calling from.

None of this is a skill gap. It’s a translation gap, and it only closes with direct K-12 experience or a long, expensive ramp-up paid for by the client’s pipeline.

What Should You Actually Compare When Evaluating Fractional CMOs?

Don’t compare years of general marketing experience. Compare years of K-12-specific pipeline ownership. Ask any candidate, specialist or generalist, to walk through exactly how they’d sequence outreach against a district’s budget calendar, and how they’d message four different stakeholders on the same buying committee without diluting the pitch for any of them. A generalist with real K-12 curiosity can usually sketch this in the interview. One without it will default back to funnel language: MQLs, sequences, lead scores, the vocabulary of a market that doesn’t buy the way K-12 buys.

The other place the gap shows up is pricing conversations. A generalist fractional CMO, unfamiliar with how tightly district budgets are locked months in advance, will often build a plan assuming flexible mid-year spend that public education rarely has. A specialist prices and paces the engagement around the actual budget calendar, which changes what gets built and when.

Midday Advisors runs every engagement through the same three moves regardless of client size: read the structure of how this specific buyer buys, put senior judgment back in the seat that’s been vacant or under-resourced, then steer the go-to-market to match how the buyer actually decides. That sequencing, structure before tactics, is the single biggest difference between a K-12 specialist and a generalist wearing the same job title.

If your organization is comparing fractional CMOs and isn’t sure which kind of experience the role actually calls for, let’s talk.

Not sure whether you need a specialist or whether your current setup already has the right instincts, just not the bandwidth? A short working session usually answers that faster than another round of proposals. You can also learn more in my Guide, What is a Fractional CMO and Does Your Education Organization Need One.

Scott Noon is the founder of Midday Advisors, a K-12 go-to-market advisory firm. If your organization is working through a version of this, let’s talk.

Frequently Asked Questions

A curriculum director champions a deal internally. She forwards the vendor’s one-pager to the business office. It talks about instructional outcomes and classroom impact, exactly what convinced her. The business office reads it looking for cost justification and implementation risk, finds neither, and the deal stalls, not because anyone said no, but because nobody gave the business office anything to say yes to.

I call the mistake underneath this the Composite Buyer: writing every piece of content for one imagined reader who blends the concerns of the classroom advocate, the business office, and the superintendent into a single persona that satisfies none of them. The fix is Committee-Aware Messaging, building distinct proof points for the distinct roles on the buying committee, so a champion has something real to hand to each person who has to weigh in before a deal closes.

Scott Noon, founder of the K-12 go-to-market advisory firm Midday Advisors, has read a lot of vendor content that was technically well-written and still failed to move a single committee member beyond the one it was quietly written for.

What is Committee-Aware Messaging?

Committee-Aware Messaging is building specific content and proof points for each distinct role on a district’s buying committee, instead of one general message meant to work for everyone who might read it. It follows directly from mapping the committee in the first place: once a champion, a business office contact, a curriculum stakeholder, and sometimes a building administrator or board member are identified as real people with real concerns, the content has to speak to each of them differently, or it ends up speaking to none of them well.

Why does one message end up written for no one?

Because writing for an imagined single reader is easier than writing for four or five real ones, and it doesn’t feel like a mistake while it’s happening. A marketing team drafting a one-pager or an AE building a proposal deck has to pick a voice, and the path of least resistance is a composite: a little bit of classroom language, a little bit of ROI language, a little bit of implementation reassurance, blended into one document meant to cover every base.

The result reads as competent and moves no one. Gartner’s research on B2B buying has found that roughly 80 percent of deals fail not because of the external sales process but because of internal consensus-building that never happens. That statistic points directly at the Composite Buyer problem. A champion armed with generic content has nothing specific enough to build consensus with. She’s asking her colleagues to trust her enthusiasm instead of giving them their own reason to say yes.

This compounds with a problem raised by the Account Rollup Gap: in districts using school-based budgeting, the real economic buyer may be a principal, not the curriculum director the content was written for in the first place. A one-pager built for a district-level instructional audience does nothing for a principal weighing a purchase against a fixed school-level budget and a staffing tradeoff. The content has to know who it’s actually trying to reach.

What does each role on the committee actually need?

The champion, usually the person closest to the classroom problem, needs content that validates the problem is real and shows the product solving it in a context that looks like their own district. This is the content most vendors already write well, because it’s the easiest role to imagine.

The business office or procurement contact needs something different: cost justification, implementation timeline, risk mitigation, and a clear answer to what happens if this doesn’t work as promised. Classroom outcome language does nothing for this reader. They’re not evaluating whether the product helps students. They’re evaluating whether the purchase is defensible if someone questions it later.

A superintendent or board-level reader, when one is in the room, needs framing at the level of district priorities and public accountability, not product features. This reader is asking whether the purchase fits the story the district is telling its community about where it’s headed, not whether a specific classroom workflow improves.

A building-level administrator, especially in a school-based budgeting district where they may control real spend, needs something closer to the business office’s concerns but scoped to their own building and their own budget, not the district’s.

None of these are hard to write once they’re identified as separate jobs. They’re only hard to write when they’re treated as one job wearing different fonts.

What to do instead

Build content in matched sets, not single documents. For each major piece, a one-pager, a proposal, a case study, produce a version or a section addressed to each committee role identified in the account mapping, rather than one document trying to serve all of them at once.

Give the champion something to forward, on purpose. The champion’s job is to build internal consensus, and she can only do that with material that actually helps the next reader say yes. A business-office-ready cost and implementation summary handed to the champion alongside the classroom-focused pitch does more for a stalled deal than another version of the same pitch.

Match messaging to buyer authority, not assumed role. If an account has been flagged as school-based budgeting with a principal controlling real spend, that principal needs the business-office-style content, cost and implementation framing, not classroom-outcome language written for a district curriculum office that may not control this purchase at all.

Keep the sets small and reusable. This doesn’t mean custom content for every account. It means three or four role-based templates, built once and adapted per account, so a rep or marketer isn’t starting from a blank page every time a deal needs a business-office-ready summary.

A champion can only sell what she’s given something to sell with

The Composite Buyer feels efficient because it’s one document instead of four. It’s actually four missed conversations wearing the disguise of one good one. A champion who believes in the product still needs real material for the colleagues she has to convince, and a deal that stalls in committee is often not a no. It’s a champion with nothing left to hand out.

If your organization is dealing with a version of this, let’s talk: calendly.com/scott-noon

This post is part of the guide Account-Based Sales and Marketing for K-12 Education Providers. Related reading: The Single-Contact Trap and The Account Rollup Gap.

Scott Noon is the founder of Midday Advisors, a K-12 go-to-market advisory firm.

Frequently Asked Questions

A rep has a great relationship with a curriculum director. She takes every call, forwards every email internally, tells the rep the district is excited to move forward. The deal sits in the pipeline as a strong opportunity for months. Then she takes a new role at a different district, and the deal doesn’t just stall. It disappears, because she was the only relationship the rep had ever built.

I call this the Single-Contact Trap: treating one enthusiastic relationship as if it were the deal itself, instead of one entry point into a deal that still has to be built with everyone else who touches the decision. Big deals aren’t found. They’re built, and they’re built with a committee, not a single champion, however genuinely engaged that champion is.

Scott Noon, founder of the K-12 go-to-market advisory firm Midday Advisors, has seen this exact pattern end more promising K-12 deals than almost any other single cause, and it’s rarely because the champion wasn’t real. It’s because the champion was the whole plan.

What is the Single-Contact Trap?

The Single-Contact Trap is what happens when a sales relationship is built entirely around one person inside a district, usually an enthusiastic champion, without deliberately building relationships with the other people who actually influence or control the purchase decision. The deal looks healthy because the one relationship the rep can see is healthy. What’s actually happening with the buying committee is invisible, because no one on the sales side has a relationship with it.

Why does one strong relationship feel like enough?

Because it’s genuinely encouraging, and encouragement is easy to mistake for progress. A responsive, enthusiastic champion gives a rep real signal that the problem is being taken seriously somewhere inside the district. That signal is valuable. It’s also incomplete, and the trap is treating it as the whole picture rather than the first data point.

Gartner’s research on B2B buying puts the typical buying group for a complex purchase at six to ten stakeholders, each with their own priorities and their own piece of the decision. That figure lines up closely with what a K-12 district deal usually requires in practice: a champion, a business office or procurement contact, a curriculum or instructional stakeholder beyond the champion, sometimes a building-level administrator, occasionally a board member. A rep with a relationship with exactly one of those five or six people has real signal from roughly one sixth of the committee that actually decides.

Building out the rest of that committee takes deliberate effort in a way that the first relationship often didn’t. The champion may have reached out first, or responded quickly to an early email, making that relationship feel like it built itself. Every other relationship on the committee has to be built on purpose, and that’s a different kind of work, which is exactly why it’s the work that gets skipped.

What does a single-contact deal actually risk?

The most visible risk is staff turnover, and K-12 has real turnover to account for. A champion who changes districts, gets promoted internally, or simply moves to a different role takes the entire relationship with them if no one else at the district was ever engaged. The deal doesn’t decay gradually. It stops.

The quieter risk shows up even when the champion stays put. A single-contact deal has no way to surface disagreement inside the committee before it becomes an objection late in the process. If the business office has budget concerns or a building administrator has reservations, a rep with only the champion’s relationship won’t hear about either until the deal is already stalling, instead of hearing about it early enough to address it directly.

This compounds with the buyer-authority question raised by the Account Rollup Gap. In a district using school-based budgeting, the champion inside the district office might have real enthusiasm and zero actual budget authority, while the real economic buyer, a school principal, has never had a conversation with the rep at all. A single-contact deal in that kind of district isn’t just fragile. It may never have been talking to anyone who could actually say yes.

What to do instead

Map the committee at the start of the deal, not after it stalls. Before a deal moves past an early stage, identify who else touches the decision: the business office, the procurement contact, any building-level stakeholders, and, per the buyer-authority mapping from the Account Rollup Gap, whoever actually controls the budget for this specific account.

Build at least one additional relationship before calling a deal healthy. A deal with only the champion engaged shouldn’t be scored the same as a deal where the rep has real relationships with two or three people on the committee. The second relationship is what turns a promising conversation into a deal that can survive one person’s calendar, mood, or job change.

Ask the champion to make an introduction, directly. Most champions are willing to connect a rep to a colleague once asked, especially once the rep has demonstrated real understanding of the problem. The single-contact trap often persists simply because no one asked, not because the introduction would have been refused.

Track committee coverage in the CRM the same way the working list itself gets tracked. If the account rollup is built correctly, a rep should be able to open a district’s account record and see at a glance which committee roles have a real relationship attached and which ones don’t, rather than relying on memory to know the deal is thinner than it looks.

A champion is a door. A committee is a deal.

The relationship that got a rep in the room was never the deal itself. It was the way in. The deal gets built afterward, with everyone else who has to say yes, and a rep who stops at the door because the door was friendly is the reason a promising conversation never turns into a signed contract.

If your organization is dealing with a version of this, let’s talk.

This post is part of the guide Account-Based Sales and Marketing for K-12 Education Providers. Related reading: The Buried Treasure Myth and The Account Rollup Gap.

Scott Noon is the founder of Midday Advisors, a K-12 go-to-market advisory firm.

Frequently Asked Questions

Marketing builds a working list of fifty districts, scores it on fit and readiness, and starts producing content built around those specific accounts. Meanwhile the AE assigned to that territory is still cold-emailing every district in the state, the fifty on the list included, using the same template as everyone else in the territory. Nobody decided this on purpose. It just happened, one function moving and the other not noticing.

I call this the Two Motions Problem: marketing running a narrow, account-based motion while sales keeps running a broad, territory-based one, without anyone in the room deciding that on purpose. Marketing is going deep on fifty districts. Sales is still going wide across an entire state. Neither motion reinforces the other, and the working list marketing built never actually becomes the list sales is working.

Scott Noon, founder of the K-12 go-to-market advisory firm Midday Advisors, sees this exact gap most often in companies that made real progress on one side of the house and assumed the other side would follow.

What is the Two Motions Problem?

The Two Motions Problem is what happens when marketing and sales operate on two different targeting strategies at the same time, one account-based and one broad-reach, without a deliberate, joint decision to align them. It’s not a failure of either function individually. Marketing did the work to build a focused list. Sales is doing exactly what its territory assignment and its comp plan reward. The failure is structural: two reasonable strategies pulling in opposite directions because no one owns the decision to run them as one.

Why does marketing usually shift first?

Because marketing is typically the function sitting closest to the data that reveals the problem. Content performance, email deliverability, and cost per lead all degrade in ways that are visible on a dashboard well before a sales team feels the same pain in a less measurable form. A marketing team staring at the Address Book Problem in its own numbers has an obvious, well-lit reason to narrow its targeting. A sales team living inside the Buried Treasure Myth doesn’t get the same clear signal because activity volume still looks like effort even when it isn’t producing results, and a rep’s territory assignment and quota structure often haven’t changed at all.

So marketing moves first, narrows its targeting, and starts building account-specific content and campaigns. Sales, still measured and compensated on covering the full territory, keeps working the way it always has. The two functions aren’t in conflict. They’re just no longer describing the same market to each other.

This gets more complicated once buying authority itself isn’t uniform across the list. In districts with school-based budgeting, the real economic buyer can sit at the school level rather than the district office. If marketing has built content and outreach around a principal as the buyer for a given account, but sales is still routing every lead in that territory to a district-level contact by default, the misalignment isn’t just about list size anymore. It’s about the two functions not agreeing on who the buyer even is.

What does this actually cost?

Research on sales and marketing alignment, including a Forrester Consulting study commissioned by LinkedIn, consistently finds that well-aligned organizations grow revenue meaningfully faster than misaligned ones, though the specific percentage lift varies by study. The mechanism is intuitive even without the research: an account that gets personalized marketing content and then a generic sales email undoes the personalization. A district that shows real engagement signal on marketing’s working list but never gets a matching level of sales attention is a wasted signal. A rep chasing territory-wide volume duplicates effort marketing already spent building account-specific context, instead of using it.

There’s a quieter cost too, in how the shift gets experienced internally. When marketing narrows its own targeting without a parallel change on the sales side, it looks to sales like marketing decided unilaterally that certain accounts matter more, without including the team that has to act on that decision. That’s a fast way to turn a good strategic shift into a source of interdepartmental friction instead of a shared win.

What to do instead

Make the shift a joint decision, not a marketing initiative that sales finds out about later. The working list, the account scoring, and the buyer mapping should be built with input from both functions, not handed to sales after the fact.

Give sales the same list, the same buyer map, and the same calendar. The working list marketing builds should be the same list sales works for outbound effort, not a separate document that lives in a different tool. The same goes for buyer authority. If an account has been flagged as school-based budgeting with the principal as the real buyer, sales outreach for that account needs to reflect that, not default to the district office.

Change what sales is measured on to match what marketing already changed. If marketing has shifted to engagement depth on named accounts while sales is still measured on territory-wide activity volume, the two functions are being pointed in different directions by design, regardless of what either team’s strategy says on paper.

Put the shift on the same calendar that both functions already share. Since nearly every district in the country runs the same fiscal year, marketing and sales don’t need separate timing; they need one shared rhythm, planned together, so the awareness content marketing builds in the fall lines up with the sales push that runs before the spring adoption deadline on the same accounts.

The list isn’t the strategy until both functions are working the same one

A focused account list that only one function actually uses isn’t a strategy. It’s half of one, waiting for the other half to catch up. The fix isn’t getting sales to copy what marketing did. It’s making the decision together in the first place.

If your organization is dealing with a version of this, let’s talk.

This post is part of the guide Account-Based Sales and Marketing for K-12 Education Providers. Related reading: The Buried Treasure Myth and The Account Rollup Gap.

Scott Noon is the founder of Midday Advisors, a K-12 go-to-market advisory firm.

Frequently Asked Questions

A middle school principal takes a demo call in October. A district curriculum director takes another call in January. Neither one mentions the other, and neither has to, because your CRM already treats them as two unrelated contacts. Nothing in the system knows they work for the same buyer.

I call this the Account Rollup Gap, and it’s the quiet reason a lot of K-12 account-based selling stalls before it ever really starts. Everything in the Next 50 model depends on seeing an account, not a contact. A working list is only as useful as the system’s ability to show a rep that the principal, the curriculum director, and the business office contact are three people building one relationship, not three separate leads that happen to share a zip code.

Scott Noon, founder of the K-12 go-to-market advisory firm Midday Advisors, has watched more account-based strategies quietly fail here than anywhere else, not because the strategy was wrong, but because the system underneath it couldn’t represent the thing the strategy was asking it to track.

What is the Account Rollup Gap?

The Account Rollup Gap is the mismatch between how most CRMs model accounts and how K-12 buying actually works. A CRM built for generic B2B assumes an account is one clean entity, a company, with contacts underneath it. In K-12, the real account is a district, and the people you actually talk to are spread across individual schools, the district office, and sometimes shared regional services, none of which a standard CRM connects to the district automatically. Engagement at the school level and engagement at the district level end up looking like two unrelated relationships instead of one account building momentum.

Why doesn’t a normal CRM handle this out of the box?

Because the underlying data problem is genuinely messy, not because CRM vendors overlooked something simple. There are roughly 13,300 regular public school districts in the United States and around 91,000 traditional public schools, an average of about seven schools per district, but that average hides enormous variation. Some districts have exactly one school. New York City Public Schools has well over a thousand. Charter schools sometimes function as their own single-school district for purchasing purposes. Some services are delivered through regional co-ops that span multiple districts at once. There’s no clean, uniform rule a CRM could apply automatically, because the real structure isn’t uniform.

Public data sources exist that map this relationship, most notably the National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data, but that data isn’t perfectly current, isn’t formatted for a plug-and-play CRM import, and doesn’t include the private and parochial schools that show up in some sales motions. Building a complete, always-current national hierarchy from public sources alone is a real data engineering project. It is not a checkbox in a CRM settings menu, and any framing that treats it as one is setting a small team up to be frustrated by a problem that was never actually simple.

Some CRMs try to shortcut the problem by grouping contacts into accounts based on email domain, assuming everyone at the same domain belongs to the same organization. That works reasonably well in generic B2B, where a company usually has one domain. It breaks in K-12 more often than teams expect, because plenty of individual schools run their own vanity email domain separate from the district’s. A principal at a school with its own domain gets auto-grouped into an account that has nothing to do with the district record the rest of the relationship lives in, and the rollup silently fails exactly where it matters most. Domain matching isn’t a reliable spine for this problem. It’s a heuristic that happens to work until it doesn’t, and K-12 is one of the places it doesn’t.

This is worth saying plainly because it’s the part most ABM advice skips. A two- or three-person team cannot build and maintain a perfect national school-to-district hierarchy, and trying to is a good way to spend a quarter on infrastructure instead of pipeline. The honest starting point is smaller than that, and it’s still enough to make account-based selling actually work.

Where does the actual buying authority sit?

The rollup problem gets more complicated in districts that use school-based budgeting, where individual schools, not the district office, control a real share of the budget, including staffing dollars. New York City is the clearest current example. Its Fair Student Funding formula is flexible funding spent at the principal’s discretion, and it made up 57 percent of a school’s total budget on average in the 2023–24 school year, used mostly for hiring but also for materials and other resources. Chicago ran a similar Student-Based Budgeting model for over a decade, though it’s worth noting CPS began moving away from full SBB in 2024 toward a different formula-based staffing approach, so it’s a well-known historical example more than a current one.

In a district like this, the economic buyer for some purchases genuinely is the principal, not the curriculum director or the business office at the district level. A CRM model that automatically treats the district office as the account’s decision-maker will misroute exactly the deals most likely to close in these districts. This doesn’t undercut the case for building the account rollup. It’s the reason the rollup has to be built carefully rather than assumed: the goal isn’t just connecting a school to its district for context, it’s correctly identifying which node in that hierarchy actually controls the money for a given purchase, and that answer changes district to district.

What to do instead

Map budget authority per account instead of assuming it. For each account on the working list, note whether the district or the individual school controls spend for what you sell, and flag school-based budgeting districts explicitly rather than defaulting every account to a district-office buyer.

Build the hierarchy for the working list, not the whole market. This is where the Next 50 model earns its keep beyond just focus. Fifty accounts is a hierarchy a lean team can build by hand in a reasonable amount of time, verifying the specifics account by account. Two thousand accounts is not.

Use NCES data as the spine, not domain matching. The safest, most common way to get school-to-district rollups right is to build the hierarchy from NCES’s Common Core of Data and confirm it against state department of education directories, then hard-code that mapping into the CRM rather than relying on the system to infer it from email domains. It’s more manual up front, but it doesn’t quietly fail the moment a school’s own vanity domain doesn’t match its district’s.

Give the CRM a real parent-account structure, even if it takes some manual setup. Most CRMs support some version of a parent-child account relationship or a custom rollup field, even if it isn’t configured that way by default. Every school-level contact on the working list should point up to its district as the actual account, so a rep opening the district record sees every relationship underneath it in one place.

Treat the hierarchy as a living dataset, not a one-time import. Schools close, merge, and get reassigned. New charter schools open. A hierarchy built once during onboarding and never revisited will be wrong within a year. Since the working list is only fifty accounts, keeping it current is a maintenance task, not a project.

Don’t wait for the data to be perfect before using it. A hierarchy that’s ninety percent right for fifty accounts is far more useful than a perfect hierarchy that never gets built because the goal was set at national scale. Start with what’s confirmed, flag what isn’t, and correct it as reps encounter the real structure in the field.

The gap doesn’t close nationally. It closes fifty accounts at a time.

No small team is going to solve this problem for the entire K-12 market, and trying to is the wrong ambition in the first place. The realistic version is smaller and still valuable: a working list where every contact rolls up to the right account, built by hand, maintained on purpose, and good enough to make the strategy underneath it actually work.

If your organization is dealing with a version of this, let’s talk.

This post is part of the guide Account-Based Sales and Marketing for K-12 Education Providers. Related reading: The Address Book Problem and The Shared Clock.

Scott Noon is the founder of Midday Advisors, a K-12 go-to-market advisory firm.

Frequently Asked Questions

Some K-12 sales and marketing teams build their targeting models around a false assumption borrowed straight from generic B2B: that buyers are staggered across the calendar, so timing itself is a signal for who to prioritize right now. In K-12, that assumption is almost always wrong.

I call this the Shared Clock. Nearly every public school district in the country runs on the same fiscal year, July through June, and in most states the budget must be formally adopted by June 30, the same deadline nearly everyone in the market is working toward at once. Districts aren’t staggered the way individual companies are in a typical B2B market, where one buyer might be mid-cycle while another just closed its books. The whole K-12 market moves on roughly one calendar. That’s not a targeting insight. It’s shared knowledge everyone in this market already has, and the real gap isn’t awareness of the calendar. It’s whether a team has actually built its own rhythm around it.

Scott Noon, founder of the K-12 go-to-market advisory firm Midday Advisors, has spent thirty-plus years watching companies rediscover the same fiscal calendar every year without ever designing their outreach cadence around it.

What is the Shared Clock in K-12 sales and marketing?

The Shared Clock is the fact that nearly all public school districts operate on the same July-to-June fiscal year, with budgets typically adopted by June 30 in most states. Because that calendar is shared across the entire market rather than staggered buyer by buyer, budget stage can’t function as a way to differentiate one target district from another at a given point in the year. It’s a rhythm the whole team designs around, not a scoring input that ranks one account above another.

Why do teams keep treating budget stage as a targeting signal?

Because it’s the instinct that works almost everywhere else. In most B2B categories, buyers really do move on independent clocks. One prospect just renewed a contract and won’t reconsider for a year. Another is mid-evaluation right now. A third hasn’t thought about the problem yet. Scoring accounts partly on where they sit in their own buying cycle is a reasonable thing to do in that kind of market, and most sales and marketing playbooks, including the ones most K-12 teams inherited, are built for exactly that kind of market.

K-12 isn’t shaped that way. According to research from California’s Legislative Analyst’s Office, school district budgets in that state are built to a governing-board adoption deadline of July 1, following the same rhythm as the state’s own budget calendar, and most other states run a materially similar cycle. When nearly every buyer in the market shares one clock, there’s no such thing as catching one district earlier in its cycle than another. They’re all roughly in the same place at the same time. Building a targeting model that scores for budget stage in this market isn’t wrong the way a math error is wrong. It’s importing a differentiator from a market where it works into a market where it can’t differentiate at all, because there’s nothing left for it to differentiate.

This mistake is easy to miss because it doesn’t look like an error. It looks like sophistication. A scoring model with a budget-stage column feels more rigorous than one without it. But a variable that doesn’t actually vary between the accounts being scored isn’t adding rigor. It’s adding a column that always returns close to the same answer, and crowding out the columns that would have told the team something real.

What actually separates one district from another right now?

If every district shares the same clock, the differentiation has to come from somewhere else. Three signals do the real work, and I call them Readiness Signals together: awareness of the problem, how much it currently hurts, and whether there’s real internal appetite to act on it.

Awareness is whether the district even recognizes it has the problem your product solves, and whether anyone inside the district has connected that problem to your company specifically. A district can be a perfect fit on paper and still be nowhere near ready, simply because no one there has framed the problem the way you’d frame it.

Pain is how urgent the problem currently is inside the district, not in the abstract but as something a curriculum director or superintendent is actively feeling pressure about this year. A perfect-fit district with a low-urgency version of the problem moves slower than a good-fit district where the problem is actively causing pain right now.

Readiness is whether the organization has the internal appetite and bandwidth to act, a champion willing to advocate, a committee willing to engage, leadership not already consumed by some other initiative. A district can be aware of the problem and feel real pain from it and still not be ready, if the internal capacity to take on a new initiative isn’t there this year.

These three signals genuinely vary district to district, the way budget stage does not. That’s what makes them worth scoring on.

What to do instead

Stop scoring the working list on budget stage, and start scoring it on awareness, pain, and readiness alongside fit. Fit tells you whether a district could be a good customer. The three readiness signals tell you whether this is a district worth spending this quarter’s limited attention on right now.

Build the team’s calendar around the shared clock instead of pretending each district needs its own. If most of the market adopts budgets by June 30, that means awareness-building content and early relationship work matter most in fall and winter, before districts lock in spending decisions, and the sales push toward a signed commitment matters most in the months just before the deadline. That’s one national rhythm the whole team, marketing and sales together, can plan a year around, instead of each rep guessing at an individual district’s internal timing.

Watch for the real exceptions instead of assuming there are none. A handful of states and a small number of districts run meaningfully different fiscal calendars. Confirm the calendar for any account where it genuinely matters rather than assuming every district in the country adopted the July-to-June default, but don’t let a handful of real exceptions bring back budget stage as a general-purpose scoring variable for the whole list.

Revisit the working list each fiscal cycle using the same three signals, not a new one. A district that wasn’t ready last year might be ready this year, not because its budget stage changed relative to anyone else’s, but because its awareness, pain, or internal appetite changed.

The calendar was never the hard part

Everyone already knows K-12 runs on a fiscal year. The hard part was never learning that fact. It was building a team’s rhythm and its account scoring around what’s actually true about this market, instead of importing a model built for one where buyers move alone.

If your organization is dealing with a version of this, let’s talk.

This post is part of the guide Account-Based Sales and Marketing for K-12 Education Providers. Related reading: The Address Book Problem and The Buried Treasure Myth.

Scott Noon is the founder of Midday Advisors, a K-12 go-to-market advisory firm.

Frequently Asked Questions

Sales executives get caught in the prospecting trap because they share a common delusion. They believe there’s a million-dollar sale out there for them if they can just find it. So they look under every rock, calling as many people as they can, emailing everyone and their brother, chasing that hidden gold. In reality, big deals aren’t found. They’re built. They’re built in partnership with a champion and a buying committee, engineered to comprehensively address a serious problem a district is facing. It’s only by going deeper and more specific that an account executive can build a deal like that.

Scott Noon at Midday Advisors calls this the Buried Treasure Myth, and it’s the sales-side twin of the Address Book Problem on the marketing side. Marketing builds too big a list because reach feels like coverage. Sales works too wide a territory because prospecting feels like the job, and narrowing the list feels like giving up a shot at the one deal that changes the quarter.

What is the Buried Treasure Myth?

The Buried Treasure Myth is the belief, common among account executives, that a large enough deal exists somewhere in an unworked territory and can be found through sheer volume of outreach. It treats prospecting as a search problem, when the accounts most likely to produce a large deal usually aren’t hidden. They’re identifiable in advance, and the deal itself still has to be built through the buying committee, not discovered through a cold call that happens to land.

Why does the myth persist even when it doesn’t work?

Because it feels like effort, and effort feels like the job. An AE working a wide territory can point to activity: calls made, emails sent, meetings booked. An AE working a narrow list of fifty accounts with real depth has less activity to point to in any given week, even when that depth is what actually produces a signed contract. Volume is visible. Depth compounds quietly, and it’s harder to defend in a Monday pipeline review.

There’s a real psychological pull underneath it too. Somewhere in a rep’s territory is a district that will sign a bigger contract than anyone expected, and no one wants to be the rep who missed it because they’d already crossed that district off. That fear is rational on its own terms. It’s also exactly what keeps a rep’s attention spread across a thousand low-probability accounts instead of concentrated on fifty accounts with real signal behind them.

The economics tell a different story than the fear does. Only a small share of any market is actually in-market to buy at a given moment, research from G2 has found the figure sits around five percent across B2B categories generally. A rep spread across a thousand accounts is spending the overwhelming majority of their attention on accounts that aren’t buying anything from anyone right now, K-12 or otherwise. Multiple industry studies, including research cited by Forrester and ITSMA, have found that account-based approaches produce meaningfully higher win rates than broad outbound. The exact lift varies study to study, but the direction is consistent: depth on the right accounts beats reach across all of them.

The territory math doesn’t work the way it feels like it should

Picture two AEs. One works a full state territory, every district, regardless of fit or readiness, sending the same outreach to all of them. The other works a list of fifty accounts scored on fit and readiness, with real research behind each one and outreach built around that district’s specific situation.

The first AE has more total contacts. The second AE has more real conversations. A district that gets outreach built around its own stated priorities, current vendor relationships, and level of awareness of the problem responds differently than one that gets the same template as five hundred other districts. The math isn’t close once win rate and deal size are accounted for together, not just activity volume.

This is also where the myth does quiet damage beyond the missed quota. A K-12 buyer network is small and connected. Curriculum directors compare notes at regional conferences and on shared listservs. An AE blasting five hundred districts with generic outreach isn’t just wasting effort on four hundred fifty of them. They’re spending down the company’s reputation in a market where reputation travels faster than in most B2B categories.

What to do instead

Keep the territory, change what it’s for. A state or regional territory still makes sense for owning and routing inbound warm leads, someone has to be the rep of record when a district in that state reaches out on its own. What shouldn’t be territory-driven is outbound prospecting. A scored account list, not the territory map, should tell an AE where to spend proactive effort. The two run side by side: territory determines ownership of what comes in, the working list determines what the rep goes out and builds.

Score the list on fit and readiness together. Fit alone produces a list that’s directionally right and immediately too large. Nearly every district in the country runs the same fiscal-year calendar, so budget-cycle stage doesn’t separate one account from another the way it might in a market where buyers move on independent clocks. What separates them is awareness of the problem, how much it hurts right now, and whether there’s real appetite inside the district to solve it. Fit combined with those readiness signals produces a list an AE can work now, this quarter, with a real reason to believe the district can act.

Change what gets measured in the pipeline review. If activity volume, calls made, emails sent, is still the primary metric for outbound effort, the incentive still points AEs back toward the myth. Measuring engagement depth and committee coverage on the working list points the same rep toward the behavior that actually produces bigger deals.

Let the AE in on why the outbound list is smaller. A rep who’s had their proactive target list quietly narrowed without explanation experiences it as a demotion, especially if it isn’t distinguished from their territory. A rep who understands the split- territory still covers what comes in; the working list is just where deliberate effort goes out- experiences it as a better way to hit a number they already wanted to hit.

Big deals aren’t found. They’re built.

The rep who closes the deal that changes the quarter isn’t the one who called the most people. They’re the one who went deep enough on the right account to understand a real problem well enough to build something around it. That’s not luck. It’s a choice about where attention goes, made in advance, on purpose.

If your organization is dealing with a version of this, let’s talk.

This post is part of the guide Account-Based Sales and Marketing for K-12 Education Providers. Related reading: The Address Book Problem.

Scott Noon is the founder of Midday Advisors, a K-12 go-to-market advisory firm.

Frequently Asked Questions

Most K-12 companies don’t have a pipeline problem. They have an address book problem, and no one names it until the CAC line stops making sense.

I call it the Address Book Problem: treating your total addressable market as your working list. It shows up everywhere in lean K-12 marketing and sales teams, and it’s easy to miss because it doesn’t feel like a mistake. It feels like coverage. Every new contact feels like one more shot on goal, one more chance the right person opens the right email at the right moment. So the list grows. Two thousand contacts becomes twenty thousand becomes two hundred fifty thousand, and somewhere in that growth, the team stops asking whether the list is the strategy or just the byproduct of not having one.

There are roughly 13,300 regular school districts in the United States, according to the most recent NCES data. That number understates how concentrated the real buying power is. NCES’s own research on the largest districts has repeatedly found that the top 100, well under one percent of all districts, enroll around a fifth of the country’s public school students. A K-12 total addressable market isn’t evenly distributed, and a marketing and sales motion that treats it as if it were is optimizing for the wrong thing from the start.

Scott Noon has spent thirty-plus years on both sides of K-12 sales and marketing, and now runs Midday Advisors, a go-to-market advisory firm built around exactly this kind of problem. This pattern is one of the most common he sees walking into a new engagement.

What is the Address Book Problem in K-12 marketing?

The Address Book Problem is what happens when a company treats its entire total addressable market as its working target list, instead of building a smaller list sized to what the team can actually engage with real depth. The list keeps growing because growth feels like progress, but a list too large to work well buries the accounts most likely to close this cycle under the weight of the ones that never will.

The pattern shows up in three places

I’ve watched this pattern play out the same way across companies at very different stages, and it’s rarely a single bad decision. It’s an accumulation.

A marketing team builds a mailing list from every K-12 contact database it can license, without a fit filter beyond job title. A sales rep works a territory list that includes every district in their assigned state, regardless of enrollment size, current vendor relationships, or whether the district shows any real signal of being ready to act. A leadership team measures pipeline health by list size and send volume instead of engagement from named accounts most likely to convert.

None of these choices looks wrong in isolation. A bigger list feels safer than a smaller one. More territory feels like more opportunity. But the accumulation is the problem. A sales rep working two thousand accounts at once isn’t running two thousand relationships. They’re running none of them well, because attention is the actual constraint, not reach. The list can always grow. The hours in a week cannot.

Do the actual math and the absurdity is hard to miss. A district deal rarely closes on one relationship. It usually takes several, a champion, a business office contact, a curriculum stakeholder, sometimes a board member, call it five or six real relationships per account. A working list of fifty accounts at that ratio is two hundred fifty to three hundred relationships. That’s a real number a lean team can run with depth over a fiscal year.

A list of two thousand accounts at the same ratio is ten thousand relationships. No team is building ten thousand real relationships, not in a year, not in five. A list that size was never actually two thousand accounts of depth. It was always going to collapse into whichever handful happened to respond, with the rest getting a templated email and nothing else. The size of the list was never honest about what a team can do.

There’s a quieter cost too, one that shows up in deliverability and reputation rather than in the pipeline report. K-12 is a small, connected buyer network. Curriculum directors sit on the same regional panels, attend the same conferences, talk in the same Slack channels and listservs. A generic blast that misses the mark doesn’t just fail to convert one contact. It’s a data point in a much smaller professional network than most SMB verticals, and that network remembers.

Why does a bigger list feel like the safer choice?

Because reach and depth get confused for the same thing, and reach is easier to measure. A list of two hundred fifty thousand contacts is a number a leadership team can point to. A list of fifty accounts, each one actually understood, its readiness, its committee, its current vendor relationships, doesn’t produce an equally satisfying number on a slide. But the second list is the one that closes deals, and the first one is usually the reason the team is too thin to work the second one well.

This isn’t a failure of effort. Teams working the Address Book Problem are often working harder than teams with a focused account list, not less. They’re sending more emails, making more calls, running more campaigns. The strategy is asking for volume when the market is rewarding depth, and no amount of additional effort inside the wrong strategy fixes that mismatch.

What to do instead

Start by separating your total addressable market from your working list. The total addressable market is every district that could theoretically use your product. The working list is the fifty, or however many your team can realistically engage with real depth this fiscal year, districts most likely to close. These are different numbers serving different purposes, and conflating them is the root of the Address Book Problem.

Build the working list on fit and readiness together, not fit alone. Enrollment size, current vendor relationships, and stated priorities tell you whether a district could be a good customer. Almost every district in the country runs the same fiscal-year calendar, so budget stage isn’t what separates one target from another at a given moment, everyone is roughly in the same window at the same time. What actually separates them is awareness of the problem, how much it currently hurts, and whether the district has real internal appetite to act on it right now. A perfect-fit district with no awareness of the problem and no one inside pushing to solve it is not a better use of this quarter’s attention than a good-fit district that’s already circling the problem and asking around for a solution.

Let the rest of the total addressable market exist as a long-cycle nurture list, not an active pursuit list. A district that isn’t ready this year isn’t disqualified permanently. It’s just not where this quarter’s limited attention should go. Keep them on a slow, low-effort cadence and revisit the working list every fiscal cycle as awareness and readiness signals shift.

Resize the list before you resize the team. A team of three or four people cannot run real account-based depth against a list built for a team of thirty. If the working list still feels too large to engage meaningfully, the answer isn’t more effort. It’s a smaller list.

A bigger list was never the strategy

It was what happens in the absence of one. The fix isn’t reaching further. It’s reaching fewer accounts with the kind of depth that actually closes a deal.

If your organization is dealing with a version of this, let’s talk: calendly.com/scott-noon

This post is part of the guide Account-Based Sales and Marketing for K-12 Education Providers. Related reading: Why K-12 Marketing Stalls and What Actually Fixes It.

Scott Noon is the founder of Midday Advisors, a K-12 go-to-market advisory firm.

Frequently Asked Questions

Most education companies have a plan. What they do not have is three plans, and that is the actual problem. Every fall, a leadership team sits down, builds one document, calls it the plan, and then spends the next year confused about why the document does not answer the questions they keep asking it. The document is not failing. It is being asked to do three separate jobs at once, and no single plan can.

There is a strategic plan, an operating plan, and a go-to-market plan. They are not the same thing at different levels of detail. They are different instruments answering different questions, and when a company mashes them into one file, it produces a plan that names ambitions no one can execute, schedules work no one can connect to a goal, and describes a market motion no one can fund. This is the fall planning ritual that produces a document nobody reads.

What Is the Difference Between a Strategic Plan, an Operating Plan, and a GTM Plan?

A strategic plan decides where you will compete and why you will win. An operating plan decides how the company will run and what it will do quarter by quarter to get there. A go-to-market plan decides how you will reach, win, and keep customers in a specific market. Same company, three questions, three plans.

Put plainly, the strategic plan is about choice. It names the few bets that matter and, just as importantly, what you will not do. The operating plan is about capacity. It turns those bets into owners, timelines, budgets, and the quarterly cadence that keeps the company honest. The go-to-market plan is about the market. It defines who you are selling to, how they buy, what will move them, and how sales, marketing, and success will work together to earn the revenue.

Each answers a question the others cannot. Strategy without operations is a wish. Operations without strategy is motion without direction. And a go-to-market plan built without either is a marketing calendar pretending to be a business plan.

Why Do Education Companies Keep Collapsing Them Into One?

They collapse the three because building one document feels efficient and because most small education companies have never had the roles that would naturally own each plan. So one leader writes one plan, and it inherits whatever that leader is best at.

The tell is in who holds the pen. When a visionary founder writes the plan, it is all strategy: bold bets, big market claims, and almost nothing about who does what by when. When an operator writes it, it is all execution: a dense list of quarterly tasks with no argument for why any of them matter. When a marketing leader writes it, it becomes a campaign calendar with a mission statement stapled to the front. None of these people is wrong. Each is writing the plan they know how to write. The organization just never asked for the other two, because it does not yet see them as separate. This is the same confusion behind hiring a full-time CMO before you have a strategy: the company reaches for execution horsepower before it has decided what the execution is for.

What Happens When the Three Plans Are Confused?

The work disconnects from the goal, and nobody can see where. Teams stay busy, quarters pass, and leadership cannot explain why a year of effort did not move the bets that were supposed to matter, because the plan never linked the effort to the bets in the first place.

I call the failure mode the Plan Collapse, and it shows up in recognizable ways.

A strategy deck that never turns into anyone’s Monday. An operating plan full of tasks that ladder up to nothing. A go-to-market motion timed to the company’s fiscal year instead of the district’s.

That last one is expensive in K-12 specifically. A go-to-market plan that ignores the K-12 budget cycle and what it means for marketing timing will run its biggest push at the exact moment districts have no money left to spend. The strategic plan can be brilliant and the operating plan can be disciplined, and the company still misses, because the market motion was never built as its own plan with the buyer’s calendar at the center. When the three are collapsed, no one owns the seams, and the seams are where the year is lost.

How Do You Build the Three Plans So They Connect?

Build them in order, keep them separate, and make each one hand off cleanly to the next. The point is not three binders. It is three clear answers that link, so the work a team does on Tuesday can be traced back to a bet the company chose to make.

Start with the strategic plan, and keep it short. A handful of bets, a clear reason each one wins, and an explicit list of what you are declining to chase. If a leadership team cannot state the strategy in a sentence or two, the other two plans have nothing to align to. Strategy is a filter for saying no, and a plan that says yes to everything is not a strategy.

Then write the operating plan as the translation layer. Every bet gets an owner, a measure, a budget, and a quarterly rhythm to check progress. This is where ambition meets capacity, and where honest companies discover they have named more bets than they can staff. Cut until the plan fits the team you actually have. An operating plan you cannot resource is just a more detailed wish.

Finally, build the go-to-market plan around the buyer, not the org chart. Who are you selling to, how do they actually buy, what earns their trust, and how do marketing, sales, and customer success share the work of winning and keeping them. In K-12, anchor the whole thing to the district’s fiscal calendar, because timing is not a detail in this market. It is the plan. Do this well and the three connect: the bet, the capacity to pursue it, and the market motion that turns it into revenue.

Give the Year a Spine

One document cannot decide your strategy, run your company, and win your market. When you ask it to, it does all three badly and leaves you unable to say which part broke.

Education companies do not have a planning problem because they lack ambition or discipline. They have one because they keep writing one plan where the work requires three.

Name the three plans, build them in order, and the year finally has a spine.

If your organization is working through a version of this, let’s talk. You can see how Midday Advisors approaches strategy and go-to-market on our services page.

Scott Noon is the founder of Midday Advisors, a K-12 go-to-market advisory firm that works with education companies and non-profits.

Frequently Asked Questions

A curriculum director now asks ChatGPT about your category before she ever visits your site. She types in the problem she is trying to solve, reads the answer, and forms a shortlist from names the model handed her. If your company is not in that answer, you were never in the room.

Most education companies are still writing content for a reader who skims. That reader still matters. But there is a second reader now, and it does not skim. It extracts. It pulls claims, attributes them to a source, and repeats them to a district leader who trusts the summary more than the sales call. The gap between content built to be admired and content built to be cited is where a lot of K-12 vendors are quietly losing visibility they do not know they had.

Why Doesn’t AI Cite Most K-12 Vendor Content?

AI systems cite content that is specific, structured, and corroborated by sources other than the company that published it. Most vendor content is vague, narrative, and self-referential, so the model has nothing concrete to extract and no outside signal that the claim is true.

Walk through a typical product page and you see the problem.

A headline that promises to empower educators. A paragraph about passion for student outcomes. A feature list with no numbers attached. A testimonial with no name, district, or result.

A model reading that page finds nothing it can safely quote. There is no defined term, no figure, no named person, no claim it can trace to a second source. So it reaches instead for a competitor who wrote plainly, or for a third-party article that described your category better than you did. The content was not bad. It was uncitable.

What Does Citable Content Actually Look Like?

Citable content carries four signals a model can lock onto. I call it the Citability Test, and you can run it on any page in about a minute.

The first signal is named entities. Real people, real districts, real roles, real programs. “Scott Noon, founder of Midday Advisors” is citable. “Our team of experts” is not. Models weight content that ties claims to identifiable sources, which is also why a 2025 analysis of AI-generated answers found that most citations traced back to individual profiles and third-party pages rather than anonymous company copy.

The second signal is concrete numbers. Not “districts take a long time to buy,” but “most K-12 districts finalize budgets in the spring, which means a vendor relationship usually has to be built six to twelve months before the contract is signed.” A model can lift that sentence whole and attribute it. The vague version gives it nothing to hold.

The third signal is structured answers. A clear question as a header, followed immediately by a direct two to four sentence answer, is the exact shape an answer engine wants. It can quote the block and move on. Content that buries the answer four paragraphs into a story never gets extracted.

The fourth signal is third-party corroboration. Models trust claims that show up in places you do not control: an EdWeek article, a state education dashboard, a practitioner writing about you on their own profile. If the only source for your value is your own homepage, the model treats it as a claim, not a fact.

Why Do Education Companies Keep Missing This?

They keep missing it because their content is built by the brand team to sound impressive, not by the go-to-market system to be found. The incentive is polish, and polish is the opposite of what a model rewards.

That is not an indictment of the people writing it. It is a structural mismatch. Brand writing is trained to be smooth, aspirational, and free of hard edges. AI extraction rewards the hard edges: the number, the named source, the defined term, the plain claim. When a marketing team is measured on how the site feels, they optimize for feel. Nobody on the team is measured on whether a model can quote page seven, so nobody writes page seven to be quoted. The result is a library of content that reads well to a human scanning for tone and vanishes the moment a curriculum director asks an AI to compare her options.

How to Write K-12 Content AI Will Cite

Start by deciding what you want to be cited for. Pick the specific questions a VP of marketing or a district leader would type into an AI tool about your category, and write a page that answers each one directly. One question, one clear answer near the top, then the depth underneath. This is the same discipline behind understanding what “built for the K-12 market” actually means in practice: you name the real thing plainly instead of gesturing at it.

Then make every important claim specific enough to quote. Replace adjectives with figures. Attach names to results. Define your key terms in single sentences the first time they appear, because a defined term is a citable term. If you say a district moved from pilot to district-wide adoption, say in how many months and with what measure, or the claim stays decorative.

Put your credibility where models can see it. The people at your company should be publishing under their own names, on their own profiles, saying specific things about the K-12 market. Third-party visibility is not a vanity project anymore. It is the corroboration layer that decides whether your claims survive an AI summary. It also happens to be the same trust-first posture that keeps district buyers from distrusting vendors who lead with product.

Finally, structure for extraction. Short paragraphs. Question headers. A direct answer block under each one. A plain attribution line that names your company and what it does. None of this costs you the human reader. It just stops costing you the machine one.

You Don’t Get to Opt Out of the Answer

The buyer’s first search no longer lands on your site. It lands on a summary of your category, and that summary is assembled from whatever content was specific and citable enough to survive. You do not get to opt out of that process. You only get to decide whether your name is in the answer.

Write for the reader who extracts, and you will still win the reader who skims. Write only for the skimmer, and the machine will hand your prospect a shortlist you are not on.

When your content is invisible to the tools your buyers now trust, the fix is not louder marketing. It is more specific writing.

If your organization is working through a version of this, let’s talk: calendly.com/scott-noon. You can also see how we approach go-to-market on our services page.

Scott Noon is the founder of Midday Advisors, a K-12 go-to-market advisory firm that works with education companies and non-profits.

Frequently Asked Questions